The literature on relational incentive contracts suggests that rms may be able to condition payments to employees on information that is not available to those outside the rm. Given this, market participants may use the magnitude of such p a yments to infer the non-public information, which then may give rms a reason to choose wage payments strategically. We combine the literatures on relational incentive contracts from labor economics and signaling to nancial markets from nance and examine equilibria of a signaling game in which p a yments from a rm to a manager convey information regarding the rm's future cash ows. Our model reveals how the nature of the rm's relationship with its manager is a ected by the rm's incentive t o c hoose wage payments strategically. We discuss implications of our model for rms' choices over the mix of compensation instruments for top executives, as well as possible e ects of executive compensation disclosure rules.
Introduction
Administering performance measurement and reward systems for top managers is a primary task of corporate boards of directors. Meetings of the full board, committee meetings, and direct communication with the rm's employees give board members a more complete view of managers' actions and opportunities than is available to outsiders. As better performance measurement can improve the provision of incentives, directors should presumably make use of all information | including market-and accounting-based measures of rm performance, but also information gained through direct monitoring that may not bepublicly available | in assessing a manager's performance. Indeed, compensation committee reports contained in rms' proxy statements frequently indicate that managers' bonus amounts depend on subjective or strategic factors that are not revealed to outsiders. 1 Our objective in this paper is to examine implications of the use of non-public information in performance measurement and reward systems for managers of publicly traded rms. The idea underlying our analysis is the following: Suppose boards of directors gather non-public information to measure the performance of top managers, use such information in rewarding managers, and the payments made to top managers are observed by market participants. Then, market participants may use the magnitude of payments made to managers to infer the nonpublic information. Given this, boards of directors may face an incentive to choose wage payments strategically, in order to a ect outsiders' assessments of the rm's prospects. We study equilibrium wage contracts that arise in this setting.
We proceed by combining two lines of existing research, one each from labor economics and nance. The possibility that incentive contracts may bebased on information observed by only the contracting parties is the subject of a growing literature in labor economics on implicit or relational incentive contracts. While much research on incentive contracting focuses on performance measures that can be veri ed by external third parties, work on implicit or relational contracts emphasizes the role of reputation as an alternative enforcement mechanism see Holmstrom 1983 or Bull 1987 . If reputation, rather than recourse to the legal system, 1 According to recent proxy statements, Sun Microsystems bases managers' pay on performance measures that are competitively sensitive," while Thermo Electron applies a subjective e v aluation of the contributions of each executive that are not captured by operating measures but are considered important to the creation of long-term value. " Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith 1996 and Ittner, Larcker and Rajan 1997 use survey responses and proxy disclosures, respectively, to study the extent to which managerial pay depends on individual-based or non-nancial performance measures that may not be available to those outside the rm. governs contracts, then performance measures need not be veri able by, or even observable to, outsiders. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1994 and Levin 1998 study reputation-based incentive contracting when some performance measures are not veri able. Hayes and Schaefer 1999 provide empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that rms use non-public information in rewarding top managers by showing that variation in current managerial pay that is unexplained by current rm performance is useful in predicting future rm performance.
Similarly, a large literature in nance examines ways in which various corporate actions can convey information to nancial markets. If there is a one-to-one mapping from private information to corporate actions, then market participants may attempt to infer the information upon observing the action. This then implies a mapping from actions to market valuation, which gives rms an incentive t o try to manipulate outsiders' perceptions by c hoosing actions strategically. Ross 1977 and Leland and Pyle 1977 , for example, study signaling models of capital structure, while Bhattacharya 1979 and Miller and Rock 1985 develop dividendsignaling models. More recently, Kanodia and Lee 1998 examine information transmission through investment and the role of periodic performance reports in mitigating incentives for ine cient signaling.
We draw on these literatures by e m bedding a simple agency model in a repeated-game-based model of reputation, and then asking how relational incentive contracts are a ected when market participants base inferences regarding the rm's future cash ows on the magnitude of payments made to the agent. In the stage game, a rm seeking to maximize the average payo to its original shareholders contracts with a manager whose hidden e ort increases the likelihood that the rm's project is successful. Immediately after the manager's e ort choice, the rm and the manager privately observe the project outcome. The rm chooses whether to pay the manager a bonus, and the magnitude of this bonus payment is observed by stock market participants. A round of trading in the rm's stock follows. Following the dividend-signaling model of Miller and Rock 1985 , we assume that a predetermined fraction of the rm's original shareholders sell their shares at this time. After this round of trading, the outcome of the rm's project is revealed, and the payo from the project is paid out to shareholders. This stage game is repeated in nitely, and the rm and manager are allowed to condition current actions on the past history of play.
This framework imposes two constraints | beyond the normal individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints | on the solution to the agency problem. A no-mimic constraint arises from the fact that, in equilibrium, rms with failed projects must not nd it worthwhile to attempt to fool market participants by p a ying the bonus associated with success. A reputational governance constraint arises because equilibrium bonus payments cannot be so large that the rm prefers to renege on its commitment t o p a y the bonus. Our inquiry focuses on how these two constraints interact to a ect equilibrium bonus contracts.
We structure our analysis by studying each of these two constraints in isolation, and then merging these analyses into a single model. We develop the no-mimic constraint b y examining the stage game under the assumption that some unmodeled governance mechanism is su ciently strong to permit the rm to commit to the second-best contract. In this setting, we show that the size of the bonus payment in the equilibrium contract increases as the rm becomes more myopic that is, as the pre-determined fraction of original shareholders intending to sell at the rst round of trading increases. When the rm is not so myopic, the bonus associated with the second-best contract is su ciently large to deter rms with failed projects from paying this bonus in an attempt to fool the market. However, as the rm's degree of myopia increases, the second-best contract may no longer satisfy the no-mimic constraint; equilibrium then requires a b o n us that is too high relative to the second best. As myopia increases further, the risk and e ort costs associated with such large bonuses can become prohibitive, and the equilibrium contract may feature pooling and full insurance for the manager.
We develop the reputational governance constraint b y repeating this stage game in nitely, under the assumption that the rm has no concern for short-run share prices. As in other repeated-game models of reputation, the maximum feasible bonus in this case is determined by the rm's comparison of the immediate savings from reneging on a promised bonus payment and the gains from future cooperation foregone as a result of reneging.
Combining these benchmark models, we characterize how the set of feasible bonus contracts varies with the rm's degree of concern for short-run share prices. Our primary nding is that this relationship is non-monotonic: the largest feasible bonus amounts may increase or decrease as the rm becomes more myopic. This result arises because of the role of the no-mimic constraint as an alternative governance mechanism | a rm that has reneged on a relational contract in the past can still credibly commit to pay the smallest bonus that satis es the no-mimic constraint in the event of project success. As the rm becomes more myopic, this no-mimic bonus increases, and the contracting environment facing the rm and the manager in the event that the rm reneged becomes more attractive. This reduces the value of the rm's reputation, and limits the e cacy of reputation as a governance mechanism. When the rm becomes very eager to signal, this fallback" contracting environment may besu -ciently attractive so that no reputationally governed contracts are feasible. In this case, the no-mimic constraint provides the only credible governance mechanism, so the largest feasible bonus amounts increases with myopia.
Because the nature of the rm's relationship with its manager is a ected by the rm's incentive to choose wage payments strategically, we obtain quite di erent results from those usually found in models where corporate actions convey value-relevant information. In most signaling models featuring myopic corporate behavior, rms take actions that hurt long-run pro tability in a futile, in equilibrium attempt to increase short-run share prices. As the rm becomes more focused on short-term share prices, it engages in more of such activity, which results in even lower pro ts. Our model yields di erent results on two dimensions. First, we nd that as the rm becomes more focused on short-run share prices, it may engage in less of the signaling activity, which in this case is paying bonuses for project success. As in more standard signaling models, increases in myopia are, in this case, associated with reductions in pro ts. Second, while we do identify conditions under which increases in myopia lead to higher levels of the signaling activity, w e nd that pro ts may actually increase with myopia in these cases. These results arise because, in our model, there are potentially two sources of ine ciency associated with the rm's use of non-public information. The rst stems from the the rm's incentive to behave strategically, while the second arises because of di culties in enforcing contracts based on non-public information. We show that the rm's incentive to choose wage payment strategically can either exacerbate in cases where reputation provides governance or mitigate in cases where the no-mimic constraint provides governance the enforcement problem.
We apply our analysis to o er some new perspectives on executive p a y practices. First, our ndings may shed some light on rms' choices regarding the mix of compensation instruments. Executives are commonly paid using a wide variety of instruments, including cash bonuses, stock, and stock options, and there has been little work by nancial economists on determinants of rms' choices over these instruments. Our analysis identi es one way in which discretionary payments | that is, payments such as annual bonuses that are determined directly by the board of directors | di er from stock-based instruments: discretionary payments may convey information that is relevant for valuing the rm, while stock-based instruments do not. Second, our analysis o ers new insight i n to potential e ects of executive compensation disclosure rules. Firms required to disclose compensation amounts will do so keeping in mind the e ects of such disclosures on the value of the rm. Our model therefore suggests that disclosure rules may a ect how rms structure relationships with top managers.
First Benchmark Model: The Stage Game with Signaling
We begin by considering a one-period model in which a rm's wage payments may convey information to market participants. A publicly traded rm hires an agent the manager to take e ort. The rm's activity consists of a project that can either succeed or fail. If the project succeeds, the rm earns s , while if the project fails, the rm earns f s . Let the probability of success, p, be a function of the manager's unobserved e ort, e, and let pe be continuously di erentiable with p0 = 0, p 0 e 0 and p 00 e 0.
We assume the rm is risk neutral, while the manager is risk and e ort averse. Let the manager's utility function for wealth bedenoted by uw, where u is increasing and concave. We assume the manager has reservation utility u. Let the manager's cost of e ort be ce, where c is continuously di erentiable with c 0 e 0 and c 00 e 0. A contract speci es a wage to be paid to the manager as a function of the outcome of the project. We write a contract as a pair s; b, where s is a salary to be paid immediately after the contract is put in place and b is a bonus paid in the event that the rm's project is successful.
The Second-Best Incentive Contract
We rst establish properties of the second-best incentive contract when the outcome of the rm's project is observable to all parties the rm, the manager, and stock market participants simultaneously. We begin by analyzing the manager's choice of e ort conditional on the contract selected. We assume the underlying structure of the problem is such that it is pro table for the rm to hire the manager and the rm is strictly better o if it induces the manager to take a positive level of e ort. Since the manager's objective function is continuously di erentiable and strictly concave in e ort, his optimal e ort choice, e , is characterized by the following rst-order condition: Using the implicit function theorem, we de ne e s; b as the solution to 1. Note that e ort is increasing in b and decreasing in s.
Under the assumption the rm holds all the bargaining power in the relationship, the secondbest contract maximizes the rm's pro ts while satisfying the manager's individual rationality constraint with equality. We can therefore write the rm's problem as We represent the solution to this program graphically in Figure 1 . Placing b on the horizontal axis and s on the vertical axis, we plot with a solid line the set of contracts that satisfy the manager's individual rationality constraint with equality. This curve begins at the full-insurance contract s; 0, where s is de ned by u s = u. As b increases, the manager takes more e ort and is exposed to more risk. To compensate the manager for these costs, the expected level of pay m ust increase. Dashed lines in the gure are the rm's iso-pro t curves. The point marked s ; b denotes the second-best contract; it is the point where an iso-pro t curve is tangent t o the manager's individual rationality constraint.
Signaling with Perfect Governance
We enrich this simple framework to explore properties of equilibrium incentive contracts when the parties to the contract observe the outcome of the project before market participants. Here, we consider a case in which an unmodeled governance mechanism is su ciently strong to ensure the second-best contract is always feasible. This allows us to focus attention on the e ects of the rm's incentives to choose wage payments strategically. Consider a single-period model with two t ypes of shareholders. See timeline in Figure 2 . It is common knowledge that fraction k of the original shareholders must, for exogenous reasons, sell their shares prior to the nal realization of the rm's cash ows. The remaining 1 , k keep their shares until the end of the period. At the beginning of the period, the rm o ers a contract to its manager. If the manager accepts the contract, he exerts unobservable e ort. Immediately after the manager's e ort choice, the project's outcome is revealed to both the rm and the manager. However, this information comes in the form of a signal that is not observed by outsiders. The rm then chooses what payments to make to the manager.
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While stock market participants cannot observe the signal received by the insiders, they can observe the bonus payment from the rm to the manager. Fraction k of the original shareholders sell their shares at a price that is conditioned on the size of the bonus. After this rst round 2 While the speci c assumption that the original shareholders have exogenously di ering time horizons is common in the literature on signaling to nancial markets see Miller and Rock 1985 , it is not necessary for our results. We need only that the rm chooses its bonus payment to maximize a weighted sum of rst-and second-round stock prices, with higher values of k indicating higher weight on rst-round prices. We make the di ering time horizon assumption simply as a way of giving a literal interpretation to the rm's myopia. Other justi cations for the assumption of corporate myopia have been suggested, and would work equally well here. For example, Stein 1988 studies a model in which a corporate raider arrives during the rst round of trading with probability k. Shareholders wish the rm to have a high rst-round stock price to prevent a potential raider from buying the rm's shares at a discount. of trading, the project's outcome is publicly revealed. Shareholders then receive the di erence between the project's payo and the wage payments, and the game ends. 4 Note that the payo to the fraction k of original shareholders who sell in the rst round of trading depends on the market's assessment of the outcome of the rm's project. If the payment from the rm to the manager depends on the project outcome, then market participants will update their beliefs as to the rm's terminal value based on this payment. This raises the possibility that the rm may wish to alter its payments to the manager in order to a ect the market's beliefs as to the project's outcome.
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In particular, a rm with an unsuccessful project may wish to pay the manager the bonus associated with success. Equilibrium, of course, requires that such attempts to fool the market must fail.
Within this framework, we examine how equilibrium contract o ers are a ected by the rm's desire to a ect share prices in the rst round of trading. Since equilibrium requires that attempts to fool the market must fail, wage contracts must satisfy a no-mimic constraint: the low" types | the rms with failed projects | must not nd it worthwhile to mimic the high" types. We assume these terminal dividend payments are non-contractible. The assumption that the rm's terminal payo is non-contractible is standard in literatures on both signaling to nancial markets and managerial remuneration see, for example, Holmstrom and Tirole 1993. 5 In our stylized model, project outcome" is intended to represent a n y non-public information the rm uses to assess managerial performance. This could re ect information that the rm does not want to disclose as in the case of a competitively sensitive" performance measure or information that the rm cannot credibly disclose as may be the case for a subjective e v aluation" of performance. Firms convey information to markets in many ways, and our model does not require that all payo -relevant information be transmitted through bonuses. It is not pro table for an unsuccessful rm to attempt to mimic a successful rm if the bonus speci ed in the contract satis es this constraint. We use graphs similar to Figure 1 to identify types of equilibrium contracts and compare welfare under each. We identify three types of equilibrium contracts. E cient separating contracts feature a one-to-one mapping from project outcomes to bonus payments and secondbest e ort and risk sharing. Ine cient separating contracts have a one-to-one mapping from outcomes to bonuses, but induce higher e ort and place more risk on the manager compared to the second-best contract. Pooling contracts have the property that wages do not depend on the project outcome; that is, no output-contingent bonuses are paid. In the text, we o er a graphical analysis to convey the main intuition for our results; a full characterization of this signaling game is contained in the appendix.
In Figure 3 , we show a setting where k, the fraction of original shareholders who intend to sell during the rst round of trading, is low. The diagram is identical to Figure 1 , except that we h a ve added the NM constraint as a solid line. This constraint requires that b is su ciently high so that rms with failed projects do not mimic rms with successful projects. Hence, all contracts to the right of the line satisfy this constraint. Since the second-best contract in Figure 3 satis es the NM constraint, a rm o ering this contract would nd that it has no incentive to deviate from the terms of the contract after learning the project's outcome. A rm with a failed project nds it prohibitively expensive to attempt to mimic a successful rm, while a successful rm pays bonus b . Thus, for low values of k, the equilibrium features an e cient separating contract. In these cases, the manager's incentive constraint induces a larger bonus than is necessary to signal | the rm's myopia therefore does not a ect the contracts o ered to managers. Figure 4 features a setting with a higher value of k. Since a higher fraction of original shareholders now wish to sell early, the temptation for rms with failed projects to mimic those with successful projects is greater. This means b must be even higher to satisfy the no-mimic constraint. The NM line in Figure 4 is shifted to the right of that depicted in Figure 3 . There are two candidates for the equilibrium contract here. First, consider the highest-pro t contract that satis es both the NM and IR constraints. This point is where the NM line intersects the manager's IR constraint and is denoted by s 0 ; b 0 . A second possibility i s that the rm
Figure 5: A pooling contract.
could choose to o er a contract that does not satisfy the NM constraint; among these, s; 0 yields the highest pro ts. To see this, rst note that no contract with b 0 that does not satisfy NM can bean equilibrium. Anticipating that the bonus would be paid even in the event of failure, the manager would exert zero e ort and the project would never succeed. Given this, the rm is better o o ering the full-insurance contract.
To determine which of these contracts will be o ered, we examine the iso-pro t lines in Figure 4. Iso-pro t lines that are higher on the gure mean lower pro ts, so the rm prefers s 0 ; b 0 to s; 0. For this value of k, the manager's incentive constraint does not induce a su ciently large bonus to permit rms with successful projects to identify themselves. Hence, rms must o er a contract featuring a larger bonus than in the second best. As this equilibrium contract departs from second-best e ort provision and risk sharing but still permits identi cation of rms with successful projects, we refer to it as an ine cient separating contract. Next, consider an even higher value of k, as shown in Figure 5 . In this gure, the pro tmaximizing separating contract, which is denoted by s 00 ; b 00 , is on a lower iso-pro t curve than the full-insurance contract. Since a very high fraction of the rm's original shareholders plan to sell at the rst round of trading, the temptation for rms with failed projects to try to mimic rms with successful projects is great. O ering a contract that permits a successful rm to distinguish itself is costly because such a contract places excessive e ort incentives and risk on the manager. For this value of k, these costs are so great that the rm is not willing to o er such a contract; rather, the rm o ers a full-insurance, pooling contract.
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The welfare implications of this model are particularly easy to study. In all equilibria, the manager receives his reservation utility and the market's valuations of the rm are correct. Hence, the welfares of the manager and the market participants do not vary as the equilibrium changes. The rm's iso-pro t lines are therefore identical to iso-welfare lines. From the above discussion, it is clear that pro ts are monotonically decreasing in k. When the rm is more myopic in the sense that a larger fraction of original shareholders intend to sell during the rst round of trading, the rm makes the manager's pay more sensitive to performance in order to permit signaling. Since the manager must becompensated for bearing additional risk and e ort costs, the rm's expected wage bill increases, leading to lower ex ante expected pro ts.
Finally, we note that our main intuition here is robust to consideration of a continuous outcome space for the rm's project. For example, we can extend our model in a manner similar to the Miller and Rock 1985 analysis. A rm with a xed stock of capital hires a manager whose hidden e ort increases the rate of return on the rm's project. The rm invests its entire stock of capital, net of wages, in the project. Wage payments are then publicly observed, followed by a round of trading. Proceeds from the investment are distributed. The nomimic constraint in this model is a di erential equation specifying how steep the wage contract must be in order to prevent rms with low-return projects from attempting to manipulate the market's beliefs. Increases in k raise the slope of the no-mimic constraint, and can cause the rm to shift away from the second-best contract toward a contract that imposes higher e ort and risk costs on the manager than the second-best. Even simple cases of this model are di cult to solve analytically, however, since the no-mimic constraint may bind over only part of the range of possible project outcomes.
Second Benchmark Model: Relational Incentive Contracts without Signaling
The premise of the analysis thus far is that bonus payments to managers can be based on information that is not held by those outside the rm. Given this, it is natural to ask how such contracts are to begoverned. Since non-public information is inherently non-veri able, such contracts cannot be enforced by external third parties. Hence, we brie y consider a model in which the rm has no incentive t o boost short-term share prices, but must rely on a reputational mechanism which w e model in a repeated-game framework to enforce its contract o er. Our analysis here is very similar to a benchmark case studied by Baker et al. 1994 , who expand on this benchmark by considering how the presence and quality of a veri able performance measure a ect the rm's ability to use a subjective measure of performance as part of a relational contract. In the next section, we combine the signaling and reputation models to study how the rm's incentive to choose wage payments strategically a ects the e cacy of reputation as a contract enforcement mechanism.
Several modeling di culties immediately arise when moving from the stage game studied above to the supergame-theoretic framework considered here. First, supergame models commonly have many equilibria, which means that de nitive predictions as to outcomes are not feasible. Second, the folk theorem suggests that as long as the future is su ciently important t o the players, any individually rational payo s can be supported as an equilibrium. We address these di culties in a manner similar to Baker et al. 1994 , by assuming that the rm's discount factor is strictly less than one, and by focusing on the set of equilibria that can be supported using trigger strategies" in which players agree to trust each other as long as neither player has violated that trust in the past. Such strategies have the virtue of being easy to analyze, but ignore issues relating to optimal punishments and renegotiation. This statement requires some quali cation. It is possible that information that is non-public at date t may become public and veri able at date t + 1 . A rm could write a contract with a manager specifying a payment t o be made at date t, with enforcement provided by recourse to the courts at date t + 1 . In this case, the analysis of Section 2 still applies. We argue, however, that many aspects of managerial performance are non-veri able, and hence that explicit consideration of reputational governance is necessary for understanding use of non-public information in rms.
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A more thorough discussion of these issues is o ered by Baker et al. 1994 . Levin 1998 shows that trigger strategies are renegotiation-proof and optimal punishments in a model of relational incentive contracts with a single non-veri able performance measure. His analysis, however, allows for contingent p a yments from the agent We e m bed the stage game introduced in the previous section in a repeated-game framework. In each period, the rm o ers the manager a contract s; b and the manager decides whether to accept employment. If the contract is accepted, the rm pays salary s and the manager selects an e ort level e. The rm and the manager then observe the project outcome and the rm chooses what bonus if any to pay. Outsiders then observe the bonus payment from the rm to the manager. To eliminate the rm's incentive to act myopically, we assume that all shareholders intend to hold their shares until the end of the stage game. Finally, project outcomes are revealed, pro ts from the current period's project are paid as dividends, and the original shareholders may sell their shares.
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This stage game is repeated in nitely, with the parties discounting the future at rate = 1 =1 + r 1.
We assume that if the rm deviates from the terms of the contract, the manager alters his behavior in all subsequent periods according to a trigger strategy. If the rm reneges on its promise to pay b o n us b if the project succeeds, then the manager punishes the rm by refusing to trust the rm's contract o ers in all subsequent periods. Since, in this case, there is no alternative to reputation as a governance mechanism, the best the rm can do in the periods after it reneges is either to o er the full-insurance contract or shut down. We assume here that if the rm o ers a contract with b 0 and reneges by paying no bonus when the project has succeeded, then market participants observe this breach prior to the round of trading.
To study this model, we rst introduce some notation. Denote by V b the maximized value of the rm's net cash ows in the current period if the rm can credibly commit to paying a bonus b for project success. Since pro t maximization implies the manager's incentive and individual rationality constraints will bind, a given b implies unique choices of salary s and e ort e. Denote these salary and e ort levels as a function of b by sb and eb. We write V as V b = p , eb neges on its contract, it keeps the current period's bonus payment b. However, the manager then punishes the rm in all subsequent periods by refusing to trust the rm's promise to pay performance-based bonuses. Since, in this event, there are no alternative contractual enforcement mechanisms, the rm's two choices are to o er a full-insurance contract in subsequent periods and earn pro ts V 0 or to shut down, earning zero pro ts. If the rm chooses to pay the bonus, then the net present v alue of its pro ts is given by 
RG
The rm chooses to pays the bonus b only if it is smaller than the value of the rm's reputation. Hence, the largest b solving RG with equality is the largest bonus that the manager is willing to trust the rm to pay. If the rm o ers a larger bonus, the manager will expect the rm to renege on its promise and will exert no e ort, expecting no bonus to bepaid. Note that, in general, there exists a continuum of bonuses smaller than the largest solving RG with equality that are also equilibria; as in most supergame-theoretic models, we are able to identify only a range of possible equilibria. Note also that if the second-best bonus does not satisfy RG, then the largest bonus that satis es RG with equality is the pareto-best equilibrium. Figure 6 provides a graphical illustration. We assume V 0 0 and plot b on the horizontal axis. The largest credible bonus is the largest b where the V b and rb curves intersect. For r = :1, the rm can achieve the second-best bonus, b , but as r increases the largest credible bonus falls. For r su ciently large r = :3, in the gure, no bonus o er is credible. The gure makes clear that the ine ciency here is related to the rate at which the rm discounts future cash ows. If the future is su ciently important, then the second best can be reached. However, as the rm's discount rate falls, the temptation to renege on the second-best bonus payment is too great for this contract o er to be credible. We refer to this source of ine ciency as impatience," and argue that this is distinct from the myopia" that led to departures from the second-best in the previous section. In our model, a myopic rm that is, one with a high value of k takes actions intended to boost short-run share prices by conveying information
rb Hr=.2L rb Hr=.1L
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Figure 6: The largest credible bonus shifts downward as r increases.
about future cash ows without changing the timing of those cash ows. An impatient rm one with a low takes actions to shift the actual timing of cash ows from the future into the present.
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In the next section, we consider how the rm's incentives for myopic behavior can either exacerbate or mitigate ine ciencies arising from impatience. myopia may hamper the use of such contracts and reduce the largest feasible bonus payment by making the fallback contracting environment more attractive. If reputation-based bonuses are not feasible, then increases in myopia may lead to larger bonuses.
Our model here is identical to that of the previous section, except that we stipulate that fraction k of original shareholders intend to sell their shares just prior to the public revelation of the project outcome. As above, each period the rm rst o ers the manager a contract s; b and the manager decides whether to accept or reject. If the contract is accepted, the rm pays salary s and the manager selects an e ort level e. Insiders then observe the project outcome and the rm chooses what bonus if any to pay. Outsiders then observe the bonus payment from the rm to the manager, and fraction k of the original shareholders sell.
We assume that if the rm reneges on its contract o er by p a ying no bonus when the project has succeeded, then market participants observe this breach immediately | that is, prior to the round of trading in which fraction k of original shareholders sell. This is a strong assumption, and we justify it by arguing that we are interested in examining conditions favorable to the use of reputation as a contractual enforcement mechanism. Note that if market participants receive later noti cation say, just after the round of trading where fraction k of original shareholders sell, then this provides a stronger incentive for the rm to renege and reduces the e cacy of reputation.
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Project outcomes are then revealed and pro ts from the current period's project are paid as dividends. This stage game is repeated in nitely, with discount rate .
We assume that if the rm deviates from the terms of the implicit contract, the manager alters his behavior in all subsequent periods according to a trigger strategy. Here, the rm's deviations can take t wo forms: rst, as noted above, the rm may elect to pay n o b o n us when the project has succeeded, and second, the rm may p a y a b o n us when the project has failed. In the rst case, we assume that if the rm reneges on its agreement t o p a y b o n us b if the project is successful, then the manager punishes the rm by refusing to trust the rm's relational contract o ers in all subsequent periods. In subsequent periods, the best the parties can do is to rely on contractual enforcement mechanisms other than reputation. Results similar to the ones we present below can also be derived under the assumption that market participants observe a breach just after the rst round of trading. Note that in order to make reputation-backed contracts at all feasible, we m ust assume that market participants observe a breach at some point. Otherwise, the market value of the rm would never fall as a result of the breach. 13 Baker et al. 1994 apply a similar assumption. In their model, if a rm reneges on a promise to pay a bonus based on a subjective e v aluation of the employee's performance, then future contracts are based only on mechanism is provided here by the successful rm's incentive t o p a y a su ciently large bonus to distinguish itself from a rm with a failed project. If, instead, the rm deviates from the agreement by paying the manager a bonus after the project has failed, we again assume the manager changes his behavior in all subsequent periods. In this case, the manager assumes that there is no relationship between project outcomes and bonus payments, so he exerts zero e ort in all subsequent periods. 14 We structure the analysis of this section by considering how each side of the reputational governance constraint i n R G is a ected by the rm's myopia. We focus rst on how increases in k impact the parties' fallback position. Then, we ask how the gains from reneging vary with k. This allows us to characterize the relationship between k and the largest feasible bonus.
The Fallback Position
We begin by examining the contracting environment faced by the parties in the event that reputational governance is infeasible. The key insight is that even after breaching a relational contract, a rm with a successful project still wants to distinguish itself from a rm with a failed project. Hence, we derive the associated no-mimic constraint. Let b be the largest bonus that a rm can credibly o er when using the no-mimic constraint to enforce the contract. If a rm with a failed project pays no bonus, then the net present v alue of its pro ts is
Suppose, on the other hand, a rm with a failed project pays b in an attempt to mimic a rm with a successful project. When the rm makes a non-zero bonus payment for a failed project, it forfeits its credibility i n p a ying zero bonus for failed projects in the future. The manager's trigger strategy, as described above, stipulates that all future bonus o ers will be ignored, so the best the rm can do in the future is to o er the full-insurance contract or shut down, earning pro ts 1=r max 0; V 0 . The fraction k of shareholders who sell at the rst round of trading receive payo s , b + 1 =rV b, since the market believes a rm paying b has a successful current project and expects to earn pro ts of V b in all future periods. The actual outcome of the rm's project then becomes known publicly prior to the end of the period. Hence, the fraction 1,k of shareholders who do not sell receive p a yo f ,b+ 1 =r max 0; V 0 , since the veri able measures of performance. The bonus that allows a rm with a successful project to distinguish itself from a rm with a failed project is the smallest solution to this inequality. We use this no-mimic constraint to characterize the bonus o ers that are credible in the fallback position. To do this, we rst de ne b fb k as the largest bonus o er the rm can make when relational governance is not used to enforce the contract. If V 0 0 and k is small, then it is possible that the largest bonus made credible by the no-mimic constraint is too small 
The Gains from Reneging
Next, we consider how a rm's incentive to signal may a ect the gains to reneging on a relational contract. To quantify these gains, we rst need to ask what payment a rm would make t o t h e manager in the event that it elects to renege. Recall from Section 3 that when k = 0 , a rm that reneges simply withholds the entire bonus payment. When k 0, however, a rm with a successful project that reneges on a relational contract may still be willing to pay the manager enough to distinguish itself from a rm with a failed project. Thus, in order to understand the gains to reneging, we rst need to specify the market's beliefs as to the outcome of the rm's current-period project conditional on observing an out-of-equilibrium bonus payment. Since reneging is o the equilibrium path, the market's beliefs as to the success of the rm's current project after observing a payment other than the equilibrium bonus or zero are not tied down by Bayes' Rule. In the appendix, we argue that application of the Cho and Kreps 1987 Intuitive Criterion yields a unique set of reasonable" beliefs for the market to hold after observing an o -equilibrium-path bonus payment. However, to fully demonstrate the range of conditions under which our main ndings hold, we consider a variety of beliefs that we argue may be reasonable for the market to hold.
Hence, in specifying the gains from reneging to derive our new reputational governance constraint, we allow for arbitrary beliefs; we let b rn denote the smallest bonus a successful rm can pay to the manager and still distinguish itself from a rm with a failed project. 
Case 1: b rn is constant
We rst consider the case where b rn does not vary with k. We assume the market assesses the probability that the rm's current project is successful to be one as long as some bonus greater than or equal to b rn is paid, and that b rn does not vary with k. Given these market beliefs, a rm that chooses to renege on its relational contract will rationally pay a bonus of b rn . The reputational governance constraint in this case is given by In the appendix, we show that if b rn 0, then there exists an equilibrium that fails the Cho and Kreps 1987 Intuitive Criterion. Therefore, the only beliefs that do not generate an equilibrium failing this criterion assess probability one to project success conditional on observing any b 0, and probability zero to success otherwise. Given these beliefs, a rm with a successful project that elects to renege on a promised bonus payment w ould rationally make a small, positive p a yment in order to distinguish itself from a rm with a failed project. Our analysis in this section covers the case of b rn = as a special case. We now characterize how the largest credible bonus under reputation varies with k. As in Section 2, we make use of graphical arguments in the text and present propositions in the appendix. Suppose rst that V 0 0 and let k k 0 . In this case, b fb k = 0 , which implies 16 The quantity ks , f is the gain to the rm in the current period from convincing the market that its project is successful. Hence, if b rn k s , f , a rm that reneges on its relational contract would not nd it worthwhile to attempt to convince the market that its current project is successful, and would pay b o n us zero rather than b rn . that the fallback position in the event that the relational contract is ruptured is for the rm to shut down. Hence, over this region of k, the constraint in RG 00 reduces to that derived for the benchmark case RG. This implies that the largest credible bonus under reputational governance does not vary with k when k 2 0; k 0 .
Next suppose that k 0 k k 2 . Under these conditions, the no-mimic constraint allows the rm to commit to paying bonus b fb k in the fallback position. To see how the reputation-backed bonus varies with k in this situation, we plot both sides of RG 00 in Figure 7 as k increases from k 0 to k 00 . Note that as k increases, the improvement in the fallback position causes the value of the rm's reputation to fall. Hence, the rm is more tempted to renege on a relational contract, and the largest credible bonus o er shifts downward from b 0 to b 00 . The largest reputation-backed bonus decreases with k on an interval of k that is bounded below b y k 0 .
Note that as k continues to increase, the curve V b , V b fb k may e v entually fall to the point where it is tangent to the line rb , b rn . As depicted in Figure 8 rm's reputation does not exceed the gains from reneging for any b, so reputation cannot be used as an enforcement mechanism. The no-mimic constraint provides an alternative governance mechanism for these values of k. Hence, equilibrium bonuses are given by b fb k, which is increasing in k. Finally, if k k 2 , then the bonus associated with the no-mimic constraint is so large that the rm prefers o ering the full-insurance contract or shutting down.
To summarize the comparative statics in this subsection, we nd a non-monotonic relationship between the set of equilibrium bonus amounts and the degree of the rm's myopia, k. For small k, increases in k do not a ect the fallback position, and hence do not a ect the set of bonus amounts that are feasible under reputational governance. For larger k, the fallback position improves as the rm become more myopic, which means that the largest feasible bonus amount falls as k increases. As k increases even further, reputational governance may become infeasible. Since the no-mimic constraint provides an alternative governance mechanism and bonuses satisfying this constraint increase with k, w e h a ve that bonus amounts increase with k in this case. Note that, as in the analysis of Section 2, it is possible that the bonus a successful rm must pay in order to distinguish itself from a rm with a failed project may exceed the second best. For even larger values of k, the no-mimic bonus may become so large that the rm prefers to o er a pooling contract, or shut down. As an alternative speci cation of the market's beliefs when observing an out-of-equilibrium bonus payment, we assume that the market assesses the probability that the rm's current project is successful to be zero if b b fb k and one otherwise. This speci cation of beliefs holds some intuitive appeal, since if the relational contract has been breached in the past, a rm with a failed project would be willing to pay a bonus of up to b fb k if doing so would convince the market that the rm's project was successful.
Case

17
In this case, a rm that chooses to renege on its relational contract will elect to pay b o n us b the immediate payo from reneging smaller, since the bonus the successful rm must pay to distinguish itself from a rm with a failed project gets larger. However, the increase in k also improves the fallback position, which shrinks the magnitude of the punishment the manager can in ict on the rm in the event that the rm reneges. Concavity o f V implies that for small k, increases in k and thus increases in the bonus the rm could commit to in the event that the relational contract is breached mean large improvements in the fallback position faced by the parties if the rm reneges. Hence, for small k the improvement in the fallback position dominates the reduction in the gains from reneging. The net temptation to renege increases, and the rm is able to commit to smaller bonuses.
Note that, as in the discussion in 4. Now let k k 1 . Assume, to start, that reputational governance is still feasible at k 1 ; that is, V b ,V b fb k has not fallen below the rb ,b fb k curve a t k 1 . Then, the largest credible bonus for k = k 1 is still determined by RG 000 . It is still the case that V b , V b fb k and rb , b fb k are decreasing with k; however, since V 0 is now less than r, the largest feasible bonus is increasing on this range. In Figure 10 , we depict an increase in k from k 0 to k 00 , and show that the largest feasible bonus increases from b 0 to b 00 . For these higher values of k, the parties' fallback position improves more slowly with k. The reduction in the immediate gain from reneging now outweighs the improvement in fallback position, and the rm is less tempted to renege on a relational contract. This means the manager can trust the rm's promise to pay a larger bonus. Note that if reputational governance is not feasible at k 1 so that V b,V b fb k is everywhere below rb , b fb k at k 1 , then the largest credible bonus o er is always b fb k, which is increasing with k. We conclude that bonus o ers are increasing with k for k 2 k 1 ; k 2 .
Finally, note again that if k k 2 , then the bonus associated with the no-mimic constraint i s s o large that the rm prefers either o ering the full-insurance, pooling contract, or shutting down.
To summarize this subsection, we again nd a non-monotonic relationship between the set of equilibrium bonus amounts and the degree of the rm's myopia. For small k, increases in k do not change the fallback position but do reduce the gains from reneging. This makes reputation easier to sustain, and implies that the largest feasible bonus amounts increase with k. For larger k, both the value of the rm's reputation and the gains from reneging fall as k increases. Initially, the value of reputation falls faster, reducing the largest feasible bonus. Then, the gains from reneging fall faster, which increases the largest feasible bonus. As above, reputational governance may become infeasible for large k. In this event, bonus amounts are increasing in k. It remains possible that the bonus a successful rm must pay in order to distinguish itself from a rm with a failed project may exceed the second best. For even larger values of k, the no-mimic bonus may become so large that the rm prefers to o er a pooling contract or shut down.
While we h a ve focused on two speci c instances of the market's beliefs when observing oequilibrium-path bonus payments, our ndings are robust to many other speci cations of these beliefs. As long as the smallest bonus that credibly conveys project success does not increase too rapidly for small k, there will be a range of values of k for which the improvement in the value of the fallback position dominates the reduction in the gains from reneging. This implies that the largest credible reputation-backed bonus o er will decrease with k on this range.
Comparison to Prior Signaling Models
Recall that in most signaling models featuring myopic corporate behavior, rms take actions that hurt long-run pro tability in an attempt to boost short-run share prices. When rms become more focused on short-run share prices, they engage in more of such activity, which results in even lower pro ts. Our model yields di erent results on two dimensions.
First, we nd that as the rm becomes more focused on short-run share prices, it may engage in less of the signaling activity, which in this case is paying bonuses for project success. This result arises because of the e ect of the rm's incentive t o c hoose wage payments strategically on its relationship with the manager. In both 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 above, there exists a range of values over which increases in k improve the fallback contracting position, thus limiting the e cacy of reputational governance and reducing the e ciency of the rm's contract with its manager. As in more standard signaling models, increases in myopia are, in this case, associated with reductions in pro ts. Our nding here parallels that of Baker et al. 1994 , who show that as the quality o f a v eri able performance measure improves, it may become harder to use reputation to enforce bonuses based on subjective performance measures.
Second, while we do identify conditions under which increases in myopia lead to higher levels of the signaling activity, w e nd that pro ts may actually increase with myopia on these regions. This result also arises because of the e ect of the rm's incentive to choose wage payments strategically on its relationship with the manager. When reputational governance is infeasible, the rm relies on the no-mimic constraint to govern the contract. For small k, this governance may not besu ciently strong to allow the rm to achieve the second-best bonus; in this case, increases in k improve e ciency by pushing the contract toward the second best.
As we indicated above, one way to view our results is to contrast the di erent ine ciencies arising from shareholders' two forms of timing-related preferences: impatience" and myopia." In the stage game studied in Section 2, myopic behavior on the part of the rm pushes the contract away from the second best, while in the repeated game of Section 3, it is impatience that limits the e cacy of reputation as a governance mechanism. Combining these models, we nd that myopic behavior on the part of the rm can either exacerbate or mitigate ine ciencies arising from impatience. While impatience may prevent the rm from achieving the second best under reputational governance, myopia can exacerbate this problem by making the fallback position more attractive. However, if the rm is so impatient so that no reputation-backed bonus o er is credible, then myopia can mitigate the problem by providing an alternative governance mechanism.
Discussion
Choice of Compensation Instruments
One open question regarding executive compensation practices is what factors determine the mix of instruments used to reward executives. Executives are commonly paid using a wide variety of instruments, including cash bonuses, equity ownership, and options, and there has been little work by nancial economists to determine factors underlying rms' choices over these instruments. While we do not attempt a full analysis of the determinants of rms' choices over pay instruments, it is clear that any such analysis must begin with a discussion of how the properties of equity-based instruments and discretionary bonus payments di er. Our model suggests one such point of di erence: whereas payments made under bonus plans can convey information to market participants, equity-based instruments do not.
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A rm's choice over the mix of discretionary payments vs. equity-based instruments would presumably be determined by a comparison of costs and bene ts.
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Since equity-based instruments su er from a moral hazard in teams problem and are subject to market-based uctuations in value, a rm may bebetter able to tailor rewards to the executive's actions using discretionary payments. However, if there are e ciency losses due to the rm's incentives to choose discretionary payments strategically, then a rm could potentially be better o if it can commit to provide incentives using equity-based instruments. This insight may o er a starting point for an analysis of the determinants of pay instruments.
Compensation Disclosure Rules
We next discuss potential implications of our model regarding the e ects of changes in compensation disclosure requirements for top managers. In the United States, the SEC requires publicly held rms to disclose compensation amounts for top executives. In 1992, the SEC implemented a major overhaul of compensation disclosure requirements. The new rules require greater standardization of the compensation information disclosed and emphasize the linkage between pay and performance. Among other things, rms must present tables detailing the annual and long-term compensation of the rm's ve most highly paid executives, estimates of the value of executive stock options, comparisons of the rm's performance to industry and market benchmarks, and details about the performance measures used to evaluate managers.
The fact that disclosure rules are necessary to induce rms to reveal compensation amounts suggests that in the absence of such rules, rms would choose not to disclose these gures. Two potential costs of disclosure have been suggested in the literature on executive pay practices. First, Murphy 1992 argues that managers bear political costs" when large pay amounts are disclosed. Other authors see, for example, Quinn 1995 have argued that a rm may not want to disclose compensation amounts or performance standards for fear of compromising its competitive position. Once disclosure rules are implemented, however, market participants can 18 Of course, discretionary grants of equity-based instruments may convey information. However, since changes in an executive's wealth stemming from his pre-existing stock" of equity-based instruments are simply a known function of publicly observable measures of rm performance, no non-public information regarding current performance is conveyed by c hanges in the value of these instruments.
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Institutional factors may also a ect this choice. In the U.S., for instance, payments to executives in excess of $1 million are not tax-deductible unless they are demonstrably performance based. observe the payments made by the rm to the manager. If an incentive contract features a one-to-one mapping from non-public information to wage payments, then market participants may attempt to infer the information from these payments.
While a full analysis of the welfare implications of compensation disclosure requirements is beyond the scope of this paper, we can o er some insight regarding the possible e ects of these rules. Our analysis suggests that rms that are required to disclose will do so keeping in mind the e ect of their disclosure on the value of the rm. Within the context of our model, one can think of the e ects of disclosure rules as increasing the value of k. If unmodeled political or competitive costs caused rms to elect not to disclose compensation amounts prior to the imposition of a disclosure requirement, then there is no scope for rms to choose compensation amounts strategically. This would correspond to a case of k = 0 . Once the disclosure rule is in place, the rm may wish to act strategically, so that k 0.
While our model does not o er a de nitive prediction as to how bonus amounts should change as k increases, we can apply our analysis to interpret some empirical evidence on changes in executive p a y practices subsequent to the 1992 changes in disclosure rules. Perry and Zenner 1998 examine changes in executive pay arrangements in response to changes in disclosure rules and report that both compensation levels and the sensitivity of compensation to rm performance increased in response to changes in the regulatory environment. They also report that the increases in pay-performance sensitivity are higher in rms with lower inside equity ownership, which, under the assumption that insiders are less eager to sell, may suggest that increases in contingent p a y associated with the disclosure rules are larger for rms that have a greater concern for short-run share prices. Johnson, Porter and Shackell 1997 report similar ndings in a study of how stakeholder pressure a ects compensation arrangements. While some observers of executive compensation would applaud any increase in the sensitivity o f p a y to performance, one possibility suggested by our model is that these changes could actually reduce welfare. This would correspond to a situation where the second-best bonus does not satisfy the no-mimic constraint arising as a result of the disclosure requirement; in this case, the resulting contract induces too much e ort and places excessive risk on the manager. It is also possible, however, to construct instances of our model in which increases in the sensitivity of pay to performance associated with stricter disclosure rules result in higher welfare.
Conclusion
In this paper, we o er a new perspective on managerial compensation arrangements by suggesting that rms may be able to condition payments to managers on information that is not available to those outside the rm. If relational incentive contracts specify a mapping from private information to wage payments, then market participants may use the magnitude of such payments to infer the non-public information. Given this, rms may make incentive compensation decisions strategically, with an eye toward a ecting outsiders' perceptions of the value of the rm. We study equilibria of a simple signaling game in which p a yments from a rm to a manager convey information regarding the future payo s to the rm's shareholders. A primary nding is that the nature of the rm's contracting relationship with its manager is a ected by the rm's incentive to choose wage payments strategically, and that the resulting relationship between feasible bonus amounts and the degree of the rm's myopia is non-monotonic.
Future research could proceed down several avenues. First, it may be possible to combine elements of our model with that of Baker et al. 1994 to study how the interplay among public and non-public measures of managerial performance is a ected by a publicly traded rm's incentive to choose wage payments strategically. Second, our observation that discretionary bonus payments may convey information to market participants may provide a starting point for a theory of rms' choices over the mix of compensation instruments. Third, our model suggests one way in which compensation disclosure requirements may a ect rms' relationships with top managers. It may be possible to build on this notion to develop a more detailed analysis of such disclosure rules. In words, this statement says that for any b 0 b such that a rm with a failed project would prefer to pay its manager no bonus rather than b 0 even if paying b 0 would induce the market to believe the rm's project had succeeded, it must be that the expected pro t from o ering the CSE contract s; b is higher than the expected pro t from o ering sb 0 ; b 0 , where the function s is as de ned in Section 3.
Property 6 is a re nement similar in spirit to the Cho and Kreps 1987 Intuitive Criterion; its role is to rule out equilibria with excessive" signaling. Such an equilibrium features a bonus contract s; b that satis es the rst ve conditions of the CSE but imposes a higher level of risk on the manager than other contracts that satisfy the individual rationality and no-mimic constraints. This equilibrium is sustained by a market beliefs assessing probability one to a failed project if the rm makes a bonus payment below b. Given this mapping of bonus payments to market values, the rm would not o er an alternate contract sb 0 ; b 0 , with b 0 b , e v en if such a contract satis es the no-mimic constraint and yields higher pro ts.
We n o w o er three propositions to characterize the relationship between equilibrium bonus contracts and the rm's degree of myopia. , an e cient separating CSE exists and there d o es not exist a contract other than the second-best that can be p art of a CSE.
Proof: We rst construct a separating CSE wherein the rm o ers the second-best contract. We then show that no other contract can be part of a CSE over this range of k.
To start, we specify the market's mapping from bonus payments to beliefs as to the project outcome. Suppose that if the market observes a bonus payment b or higher, it assesses the probability that the rm's project has succeeded to be one. Otherwise, the market assesses the probability of project success to be zero.
To establish property 1, note that a rm with a successful project is prevented by an unmodeled governance mechanism from mimicking a rm with a failed project. A rm with a failed project nds that the no-mimic constraint is satis ed, and chooses not to pay the success bonus b . To see this, note that, given the speci ed mapping from bonus payments to rm valuation, the no-mimic That is,k is the value of k for which the rm's pro ts when o ering the contract featuring the smallest bonus that satis es the no-mimic constraint are the same as its pro ts when o ering the full-insurance contract. Referring back to Figure 4 ,k is the value of k for which the NM line passes through the intersection of the IR curve and the isopro t curve corresponding to the full-insurance contract. If the full-insurance contract yields negative pro ts, then thek equates the pro ts under the no-mimic contract to zero.
Proposition 2 For k 2 b s, f ; min k ;1 i , an ine cient separating CSE exists. For a given k, the separating contract is unique, features bonus payment k s , f , and induces higher e ort and places more risk on the agent than the second-best contract. As k increases over this interval, welfare d e creases.
Proof: We rst construct the equilibrium, then show that no other contract can be part of a CSE.
Suppose that if the market observes a bonus payment k s , f or higher, it assesses the probability that the rm's project has succeeded to be one. Otherwise, the market assesses the probability of project success to be zero. The no-mimic constraint i s satis ed with equality for this bonus, so CSE condition 1 is met. Given this, the market's assessment of the project outcome conditional on the bonus is correct, so 4 is met as well. Properties 2, 3, 5 and 6 are satis ed by construction.
The contract sk s , f ; k s , f and the speci ed mapping from bonus payments to valuations therefore constitute a CSE.
To show that no other contract can be part of a CSE, we rst consider an arbitrary b k s , f .
A contract featuring this bonus does not satisfy the no-mimic constraint, so a rm with a failed project would pay the bonus and the contract violates CSE condition 1. Next consider an arbitrary b k s , f . Such a contract violates condition 6, since the rm earns strictly higher pro ts if it o ers the contract with bonus k s , f . Hence, no contract o ering a bonus other than k s , f can be an equilibrium. Since bonus levels are increasing in k, it follows directly that the manager exerts more e ort and is exposed to more risk. To see that welfare is decreasing in k, rst note that the payo s to the manager and the stock market participants do not vary with k. Hence, pro ts are the only variable component of welfare. Since the rm's objective function is concave and the bonus associated with the ine cient separating contract is both i greater than the second-best bonus and ii increasing with k, pro t and hence welfare decreases with k.2 Proposition 3 Ifk 1, then for k 2 k;1 , either there exists a CSE featuring pooling, or the rm shuts down.
Proof: First note that any contract paying bonus b k s , f violates CSE condition 1. A rm o ering a contract paying a bonus larger than k s , f earns pro ts sk s , f ; k s , f ; 1; 0 , which, by the de nition ofk, is less than the pro t it earns from o ng the pooling contract s0; 0, or shutting down. CSE condition 3 implies that the rm either o ers a contract featuring zero bonus, or shuts down.2
Proofs from Section 4.1 To establish v, we note that from the de nition of k 2 ,b is unde ned for k k 2 . Hence b fb k = 0 . 2
Proofs from Section 4.2
An equilibrium fails the Cho and Kreps 1987 Intuitive Criterion if there is a type of sender that receives less than its equilibrium payo by playing a particular action a for all possible speci cations of the receiver's beliefs conditional on a and a type of sender 0 that receives more than its equilibrium payo when playing a as long as the receiver assesses Pr j a = 0 . See Fudenberg and Tirole 1995 for a discussion. We show that if the market assesses probability zero to project success after observing a non-zero bonus payment, then there exists an equilibrium that fails the Intuitive Criterion. It follows that the only beliefs for which there are no equilibria that fail the Intuitive Criterion assess probability one to project success for any non-zero bonus payment. We rst construct an equilibrium given these beliefs, and then show that this equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion. Under the assumption that reputational governance is in place, the largest 
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To apply the Intuitive Criterion, we rst compare the equilibrium payo to a rm with a failed project to the payo when making a bonus payment = b rn , where 0 is arbitrarily small assuming the market assesses the probability of success is one conditional on observing . The equilibrium payo to a rm with a failed project is given by f + 1 =rV b : If a rm with a failed project make s a b o n us payment and the market assesses project success, then the fraction k of original shareholders who sell their shares at the rst round of trading receive the payo due to a rm with a successful project that has broken its relational contract. The fraction 1 , k who hold their shares earn f in the current period, and, since the rm breaks its commitment not to pay b o n uses for project success, earn the future payo associated with the inability t o p a y output-contingent b o n uses. The average payo to the original shareholders is Together, 12 and 17 imply 16, so we h a ve that a rm with a failed project prefers its equilibrium payo to its payo when paying . Hence, if we can show that a rm with a successful project prefers its payo when paying bonus assuming the market assesses Prob success j = 1 t o i t s equilibrium payo , then this equilibrium fails the Intuitive Criterion. For a rm with a successful project, the equilibrium payo is Proofs from Section 4.2.2
We restrict attention to equilibria featuring trigger strategies and focus on identifying the largest bonus amounts that are feasible under reputational governance. A strategy for the rm consists of one wage contract to be o ered in the event that the rm has not breached past relational contracts so that the history of play is cooperative, and another contract to be o ered otherwise. After observing the rm's contract o er, the manager chooses whether to accept the o er, and if so, what level of e ort to undertake. A strategy for the manager consists of two mappings from contract o ers to contract acceptance and e ort decisions: one mapping is used if play has been cooperative, while another is used otherwise. The manager plays a trigger strategy in which he trusts the rm's promise to pay b o n uses as part of a relational contract if and only if the rm has not breached a relational contract in the past. If the rm has breached a relational contract in the past, then the manager assumes the rm will do so again.
We de ne Relational Contract-Signaling Equilibrium RCSE to consist of a strategy for the rm, a strategy for the manager, and a mapping from observed bonus payments and the history of play t o market values that satis es the following properties:
1. Taking the history of play, the mapping from wage payments and history to market values, and the manager's strategy as given, the rm's contract o er and choice of bonus payment m ust maximize the average payo to original shareholders.
2. Taking the history of play, the mapping from wage payments and history to market values, and the rm's strategy as given, the manager's participation and e ort decisions must maximize his expected utility.
3. The market's assessment of the value of the rm conditional on the observed bonus payment and the history of play m ust be correct. Condition 4 is a re nement that eliminates equilibria with excessive" signaling. We refer to the largest feasible bonus under an RCSE as the RCSE bonus, and attempt to characterize how the RCSE bonus varies with k. Our propositions here refer to the case studied in Section 4.2.2; proofs for the case studied in Section 4.2.1 are similar.
Proposition 6 Suppose V 0 0. Then for k 2 0; k 0 , the RCSE bonus does not vary with k.
Proof: First note that in the event that the relational contract has been breached in the past, the rm elects not to o er a contract that will be accepted by the manager. The re nement of property 4 eliminates all equilibria with excessive" signaling. Hence, the only bonus the rm can credibly o er is that characterized by the function b fb k. Since by Proposition 4 b fb k = 0 when k 2 0; k 0 and V 0 0, the rm is best o it does not o er a contract that will be accepted by the manager. Hence, the rm's pro t in the fallback position is zero.
Given this, the bonuses feasible under reputational governance are those b satisfying V b rb:The RCSE bonus is the largest solution to this inequality, and since no term in this inequality v aries with k, we h a ve that the RCSE bonus does not depend on k on this interval.2 Proposition 7 Suppose V 0 0 and k 2 0; k 1 , or that V 0 and k 2 k 0 ; k 1 . For a given k in this interval, if the RCSE bonus is greater than b fb k, then the RCSE bonus is strictly decreasing in k at that point. If the RCSE bonus is equal to b fb k, then the RCSE bonus is strictly increasing in k at that point.
Proof: In the event that the relational contract has been breached in the past, the rm can rely on the no-mimic constraint a s a g o vernance mechanism. Again since the re nement of property 4 eliminates equilibria with excessive" signaling, the bonus that can be credibly o ered in the fallback position is given by b fb k. Since k 1 k 2 , w e h a ve from Proposition 4 that b fb k is strictly increasing with k on this interval.
Given this, the reputational governance constraint i s V b,V b fb k rb,b fb k: If this inequality is satis ed for some b, then the RCSE bonus is the largest such solution. Since, by de nition of k 1 , V b , V b fb k decreases faster with k on this interval than rb , b fb k, the RCSE bonus decreases with k. If, on the other hand, the reputational governance constraint is not satis ed for any b, then the RCSE bonus is given by b fb k, which is strictly increasing in k.2 Proposition 8 Suppose k 2 k 1 ; min k 2 ; 1 . The RCSE bonus is weakly increasing in k over this interval.
Proof: Here, the rm can still rely on the no-mimic constraint a s a g o vernance mechanism in the event the relational contract is breached. As property 4 eliminates equilibria with excessive" signaling, the bonus that can be credibly o ered in the fallback position is given by b fb k. Since k 2 k 0 ; k 2 , we h a ve from Proposition 4 that b fb k is strictly increasing with k on this interval.
Given this, the reputational governance constraint i s V b,V b fb k rb,b fb k: If this inequality is satis ed for some b, then the RCSE bonus is the largest such solution. Since, by de nition of k 1 , V b , V b fb k decreases slower with k on this interval than rb , b fb k does, the RCSE bonus increases with k. If, on the other hand, the reputational governance constraint is not satis ed for any b, then the RCSE bonus is given by b fb k, which is strictly increasing.2 Proposition 9 If k 2 1, then for k 2 k 2 ; 1 , the RCSE bonus does not vary with k.
Proof: First note that in the event that the relational contract has been breached in the past, then the rm either o ers a contract featuring bonus zero, or elects not to o er a contract that will be accepted by the manager. This holds since from Proposition 4, b fb k = 0 f o r k 2 k 2 ; 1 . If V 0 0, then the rm o ers the full-insurance contract if the relational contract has been breached. If V 0 0, then the rm prefers to shut down.
Given this, the bonuses feasible under reputational governance are those b satisfying V b,max 0; V 0 rb: The RCSE bonus is the largest solution to this inequality. Since no term in this inequality v aries with k, w e h a ve that the RCSE bonus does not depend on k on this interval.2
